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Abstract. Recently, with the booming development of software industry,
more and more malware variants are designed to perform malicious
behaviors. The evolution of malware makes it difficult to detect using
traditional signature-based methods. Moreover, malware detection has
important effect on system security. In this paper, we present SCGDet,
which is a novel malware detection method based on system call graph
model (SCGM). We first develop a system call pruning method, which can
exclude system calls that have little impact on malware detection. Then we
propose the SCGM, which can capture the semantic features of run-time
program by grouping the system calls based on the reachability relation.
We aim to obtain the generic representation of malicious behaviors with
similar system call patterns. We evaluate the performance of SCGDet
using different machine learning algorithms on the dataset including 854
malware samples and 740 benign samples. Compared with the traditional
n-gram method, the SCGDet has the smaller feature space, the higher
detection accuracy and the lower false positives. Experimental results
show that SCGDet can reduce the average FPR of 14.75% and improve
the average Accuracy of 8.887%, and can obtain a TPR of 97.44%, an
FPR of 1.96% and an Accuracy of 97.78% in the best case.
Keywords: Malware detection · System call Pruning · System call graph
model (SCGM) · Semantic analysis.
1 Introduction
Malicious software is referred to as malware, which is designed to perform various
malicious activities, such as leaking private information, disabling targeted host
and so on. Nowadays, the exponential growth of malware is a major threat in the
software industry. McAfee, an anti-malware vendor [1], reported that the total
number of malware samples has grown almost 34% over the past quarters to more
than 774 million samples. Meanwhile, with the booming development of software
industry, the malware has greatly evolved and become very sophisticated.
Given the alarming growth of malware, a large number of researches have
focused on proposing malware detection techniques. Roughly, the malware detec-
tion techniques can be divided into two broad categories: static malware analysis
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and dynamic malware analysis. Traditional anti-virus software usually depends
on static signature-based method to detect the malware [9]. Though these static
methods can detect malicious applications before they are executed. However,
the static malware analysis methods can be evaded using the encryption, the
obfuscation or the packing [19]. Malware authors can write several malware
variants that have similar functionality but different signatures to evade static
malware detection methods, and the zero-day malware can also evade static
malware analysis.
In response to this, various dynamic malware detection approaches have
been proposed [5–8,12], which focus on the program behaviors during execution.
In particular, these techniques inspect the run-time behaviors of program by
analyzing the system calls. The principal dynamic behavior-based malware
detection methods include function call monitoring [5], information flow tracking
[7], sequence modeling of system calls using n-gram model [6], individual system
call analysis [8] and behavioral graphs [12]. Though these approaches can detect
the obfuscated malware and the variants of malware, they require a large amount
of time and resources to carry out the detection. Moreover, the number of features
generated by these approaches is huge, which results in the scalability of these
approaches is highly problematic..
In this paper, we propose the SCGDet that exploits the following two obser-
vations to perform malware detection. Experimental observation 1 : The malware
usually invokes security-critical system calls to achieve malicious activities. For
example, the Brk exploit uses repetitively brk system call to increase the data seg-
ment of user program and overloads the main memory. Experimental observation
2 : Malware and its variants belonging to the same family usually invoke similar
system call patterns due to performing the similar malicious behaviors. Based
on the above observations, we propose the system call graph model (SCGM) to
capture the semantic features of malicious behaviors. Our work aims to obtain
the generic feature representation of malicious behaviors with similar system call
patterns. Therefore, our approach has the potential to detect malware variants.
We apply different machine learning algorithms to perform malware detection,
and evaluate the performance of SCGDet using the dataset including 854 mal-
ware samples and 740 benign programs. In summary, we make the following
contributions in this paper:
1. We propose SCGDet, which is a novel malware detection method based
on SCGM. The SCGM can capture the semantic features of programs by
grouping the system calls based on the reachability relation and considering
the frequency of these security-critical system call patterns.
2. Based on statistical experiments, we propose and formalize a novel system
call pruning method in order to exclude system calls that have few effect on
malware detection.
3. We evaluate the performance of SCGDet using benign and malware samples.
Experimental results show that SCGDet can obtain a TPR of 97.44%, an
FPR of 1.96% and an Accuracy of 97.78% in the best case. Compared with
the traditional n-gram technique, experimental results demonstrate that
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our approach reduces significantly the feature space, have the lower false
positives and the higher detection accuracy. Specifically, SCGDet can reduce
the average FPR of 14.75% and improve the average Accuracy of 8.887%.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces our
proposed malware detection method in detail. Experiment and evaluation are
presented in Section III, and Related works are discussed in Section IV. Section
V concludes the paper and future work.
2 Methodology of SCGDet
In this section, we introduce the proposed malware detection technique in detail.
Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of SCGDet, which consists of training
stage and testing stage. The training stage contains the system call tracing and
pruning, the feature construction and generation and the malware detection
model generation. Then, we use this malware detection model to predict whether
the program under detection is malware during the testing stage.
Malware
Benign
?
System Call Tracing 
and Pruning
Construct SCGM
Feature 
extraction
(feature1, fre1)
…
(feature2, fre2)
(feature3, fre3)
(featuren, fren)
Training
model
Malware
Benign
Training stage
Software 
under test
Feature Construction
Feature Construction
Testing stage
Malware 
Detection Model
Fig. 1. The overview of SCGDet.
2.1 System Call Tracing and Pruning
System call tracing To generate system call trace records, all malware samples
were executed in a controlled and virtualized environment running 64-bit Ubuntu
18.04 with Linux 4.15 Kernel. We use the strace, which is a Linux debugger
to trace system calls and signals, to generate system call trace records of each
malware sample. In contrast, all benign samples were executed in a normal
environment and common operations were performed on the benign programs.
In a similar way, we also use strace to generate system call trace records of each
benign sample.
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System call pruning Generally, no program requests all the system calls.
Moreover, when we analyze a large number of programs, the total number of
system calls requested by all the programs will be huge, which can result in the
considerable time overhead. Therefore, we first identify the valuable system calls
to eliminate the need of considering all system calls. We propose the following
two rules to filter out system calls that have little impact on malware detection.
Rule 1: Exclude system calls that are commonly requested by both malware
and benign samples Each system call describes a particular operation, and the
benign programs and malicious programs should request different system calls
corresponding to their operational needs. That is, we do not need to analyze all
system calls to bulid the malware detection model. As a result, we should exclude
system calls that are commonly used by both benign and malicious programs,
For example, system call close are frequently requested by both malicious and
benign programs.
For this purpose, we first create two matrices and a list, M, B and SC. SC
contains all the different system calls that appear in the dataset. M is a matrix of
system calls used by malware samples, and B is a matrix of system calls used by
benign programs. More formally, SC, M and B are shown as follows, respectively,
where l represents the number of different system calls, m (854) indicates the
number of malware samples in the dataset and n (740) indicates the number
of benign samples in the dataset. Mij represents whether the j-th system call
is requested by the i-th malware sample, and Bij represents whether the j-th
system call is requested by the i-th benign sample, while ’1’ indicates yes and ’0’
indicates no.
SC =
[
SC1 SC2 · · · SCi · · · SCl
]
(1)
M =

M11 M12 · · · M1l
M21 M22 · · · M2l
...
...
. . .
...
Mm1 Mm2 · · ·Mml
 (2)
B =

B11 B12 · · · B1l
B21 B22 · · · B2l
...
...
. . .
...
Bn1 Bn2 · · · Bnl
 (3)
Then we use the following formula to calculate the distribution of each system
call, where mn is used to balance the effect of different sizes of malware dataset
and benign dataset, and D(SCj) represents the distribution of the j-th system
call. The result of D(SCj) ranges from 1 to -1. If D(SCj) = 1, this means that
system cal SCj is only requested by the malware samples. If D(SCj) is close to 0,
this means that SCj have little impact on malware detection because
∑m
i=1Mij
is closely equal to
∑n
i=1Bij . If D(SCj) = -1, this means that system call SCj is
only requested by the benign samples. Finally, we filter out those system calls
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that the value of distribution is closely equal to 0.
D(SCj) =
∑m
i=1Mij −
∑n
i=1Bij ∗ mn∑m
i=1Mij +
∑n
i=1Bij ∗ mn
(4)
Rule 2:Exclude system calls that appear only in few samples To further filter
out the system calls that are not helpful for malware detection. We do not
consider those system calls to build malware detection model, which appear only
in few samples. We use the following formula to measure this rule, where N(SCj)
indicates the number of malware and benign samples using the j-th system call.
The result of N(SCj) has a value ranging between 0 and m + n. Similarly, we
filter out the system calls that the value of N(SCj) is closely equal to 0. For
example, the system call signal only requested by one sample, so we should filter
out it according to Rule 2.
N(SCj) =
m∑
i=1
Mij +
n∑
i=1
Bij (5)
Finally, we neglect those system calls that have little impact on malware
detection and consider only these meaningful and security-critical system calls,
as listed in Table 1. It’s worth noting that a file is an instance of any operated file
or I/O device. We observe that the combination of these system calls (in other
words, system call pattern) can result in the specific malicious activities. For
example, the virus first copies its content into the temporary file, then changes
the permission and the accessed time, and finally executes the modified file.
Therefore, we can capture specific malicious behaviors of malware samples by
analyzing the system call patterns.
Table 1. Common security-critical system calls in our dataset
Resource Types Related system calls
File System open, openat, read, write, close, select, stat, fstat, lstat, statfs,
stat64, fstat64, readlink, access, fcntl, ioctl, chdir, fchdir,
getdents64, getcwd, lseek, utime, uname, unlink, umask, chmod,
rename, execve
Process rt sigaction, rt sigprocmask, fork, rt sigsuspend, getpid, clone,
waitpid, nanosleep, set tid address, prctl, getppid, pipe, kill
Network socket, connect, setsocket, bind, getsockname, listen
Memory brk, mmap, mmap2, munmap, mprotect
2.2 Feature Construction: System Call Graph Model
Feature construction is a crucial step of our proposed malware detection approach.
The performance of any malware detection models depends heavily on how
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precisely the features represent the characteristics of the samples. In this work,
we propose a novel feature construction method, system call graph model (SCGM),
to capture the semantic features of typical malware behavior. We will detailedly
illustrate the SCGM with the system call trace shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. A system call trace example.
The SCGM is based on the high-level semantic features of malicious behaviors.
We use security-critical system calls along with their arguments and return values
to analyze malicious behaviors. We aim at to obtain the generic representation
of malicious behaviors in order to detect the variants of the malware that have
similar system call patterns. Meanwhile, we also consider the frequency of security-
critical system call patterns for feature construction in order to capture malicious
behaviors that execute repetitively specific system call pattern to overload the
system. In short, we propose the following properties to capture the high-level
semantic features of malicious behaviors.
Property 1: Group system calls based on reachability relation The observation
behind this property is that malware and its variants usually perform a series of
similar operations on particular resources in order to accomplish similar malicious
behaviors. For example, in the system call trace shown in Figure 2, the virus
first copies its content into the temp0 file, then changes the permission and the
accessed time, and finally executes the modified file. These specific system call
patterns can reveal malicious intents of malware. To group system calls based on
reachability relation, we redeclare the concept of system call graph first.
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In our work, the system call graph (SCG) can represent all relationships
among system calls during program execution. The SCG is a directed graph and
SCG = (V, Entity, E), where V is the set of various system calls, Entity is the
set of source and destination files, and E is the set of edges. More formally, E
= {< n1, n2 > |n1 ∈ (V ∪ Entity), n2 ∈ V }. That is, the edge < n1, n2 > is an
out-edge of vertex or entity n1 and in-edge of vertex n2.
In the system call trace example shown in Figure 2, V = {openat, brk, ..., utime,
execve}, Entity = {‘/usr/bin′, ‘file1.out′, ..., ‘V irusShare 4da7b′, ‘/tmp/temp0′},
and E = {< ‘/usr/bin′, openat >,< openat, getdents64 >,< ‘file1.out′, open >,
..., < ‘/tmp/temp0′, utime >,< ‘/tmp/temp0′, execve >} as shown in Figure 3.
Based on the SCG, we consider that the vertices that satisfy the reachability
relations shown in Figure 4 should be grouped in the same set. 1) if v1 and v2
are directedly connected in SCG, v1 and v2 should be grouped in same set. 2) if
v1 and v2 are directedly connected and v1 and v3 are also directedly connected in
SCG, v1, v2 and v3 should be grouped in same set. 3) if v1 and v3 are directedly
connected and v2 and v3 are also directedly connected in SCG, v1, v2 and v3
should be grouped in same set. 4) if entity1 and v1 are directedly connected
and entity1 and v2 are also directedly connected in SCG, v1 and v2 should be
grouped in same set.
Property 2: Counting the frequency of security-critical system call patterns
The observation behind this property is that malware often executes repetitively
security-critical system call patterns in order to overload the system resources
(such as Memory, CPU), which can result in the denial of service, the CPU-
starvation and even the crashing of OS in resource limited systems. For example,
the Brk.c exploit invokes repetitively brk system call to increase the data segment
of user program in order to overloads the main memory. Therefore, recording the
frequency of these security-critical system call patterns is important to identify
similar malicious behaviors.
Hence, for the system call trace example shown in Figure 2, the feature set gen-
erated by our proposed SCGM contains {brk}, {mmap}, {open, fstat64, read},
{openat, getdents64} and {open, open, read, write, chmod, utime, execve}, where
the frequency of system call patterns {brk} and {open, fstat64, read} are equal
to 2.
2.3 Feature Vector Generation
We utilize these system call patterns generated by the SCGM to construct a feature
vector of size N for each sample, where N is the total number of different system
call patterns (features) obtained from both malware samples and benign samples.
As listed in Table 2, the feature vector FV = {< Feature1, f1 >,< Feature2, f2 >,
..., < FeatureN , fN >, < Class, 1/0 >}, where f indicates the frequency of this
unique system call pattern (feature) in the current sample. If f is equal to 0,
which indicates the corresponding system call pattern does not appear in the
sample. It is worth noting that the last feature of FV is the label of sample, and
1 for malware and 0 for benign.
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openat
3
brk
4
brk
5
getdents
64
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mmap
13
open
14
open
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write
17
chmod
18
utime
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execve
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8
read
9
open
10
fstat64
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read
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../lib.so.6
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entity   :  system call    :  source file or destination file
Fig. 3. The SCG corresponding to system call trace example shown in Figure 2.
v2
v1
v3
v1 v2
entity1
v1 v2 v1
v3
v2
entity   :  system call    :  source file or destination file
Fig. 4. Four reachability relations (structures) in the SCG.
Table 2. The example of the feature vector
Feature Feature1 Feature2 Feature3 ... FeatureN Class
Frequency f1 f2 f3 ... fN 1/0
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3 Experiments and Evaluations
In this section, we first introduce the dataset and the evaluation metrics used in
our experiments. Then, we present the experimental results in detail. We conduct
lots of experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of SCGDet in distinguishing
between malware and benign programs. We use python language to implement
the system call tracing and pruning as well as feature construction, and use
scikit-learn toolkit [16] to obtain malware detection model.
3.1 Dataset and Metrics
We collect 854 malware samples from VirusShare [2], which include trojan,
exploit, virus and various malicious scripts. We use the Virustotal [3] online tool
to identify the types of these malware samples. In addition, we also collect 740
benign programs on Ubuntu 18.04 OS, which contains internet, system tools,
video, office and so on. We divided the entire dataset into 70%-30%. 70% of the
samples were used to generate the malware detection model using the standard
10-fold cross-validation approach. The remaining 30% of the samples were used
to evaluate the performance of malware detection model.
For the malware detection, we first introduce the confusion matrix as shown
in Table 3. Finally, we use the following evaluation metrics in our experiments:
True Positive Rate (TPR) = TPTP+FN , False Positive Rate (FPR) =
FP
FP+TN
and Accuracy (ACC) = TP+TNTP+FN+FP+TN .
Table 3. The confusion matrix for malware detection
Predicted class
Malware Benign
Actual class
Malware True Positive (TP) False Negative (FN)
Benign False Positive (FP) True Negative (TN)
3.2 Experimental results
We apply three widely used machine learning algorithms to build malware
detection models: Logistic Regression (LR), Support Vector Machine (SVM) and
Random Forest (RF). In order to compare the malware detection performance
with other methods, we also implement 4-gram model on our dataset, which has
better performance as presented in [6] and [15].
Feature Space Analysis Firstly, we analyze the difference in the feature space
obtained by the 4-gram method and our proposed feature construction method,
SCGM. For this purpose, we randomly select 25%, 50% and 75% of the samples in
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our dataset for feature construction using 4-gram modeling technique and SCGM,
respectively. Then we repeatedly perform this process five times and select all
samples (just one time) in our dataset for feature construction. we record the
sizes of different feature spaces and the average sizes of different feature spaces,
as shown in Table 4 and Table 5. We visualize the difference in the average size
of feature space between 4-gram model and SCGM, as shown in Figure 5. In can
be seen that, for 4-gram model, the number of features grows proportionally with
the number of samples. However, for SCGM, we observe that the curve gradually
flattens as the number of samples increases.
Table 4. The size of different feature spaces generated by different numbers of samples
The size of feature space
Samples 25% 50% 75% 100%
4-gram 4935 5940 5195 4770 5500 6195 5900 6040 6015 6405 6995 6895 6515 6560 6890 7305
SCGM 150 152 150 169 153 178 171 179 174 178 181 189 190 184 186 191
Table 5. The average size of different feature spaces listed in Table 4
The average sizes of feature space
Samples 25% 50% 75% 100%
4-gram 5268 6111 6771 7305
SCGM 155 176 186 191
(a) 4-gram (b) SCGM
Fig. 5. The analysis of feature space between 4-gram model and SCGM.
Because the SCGM groups system calls based on reachability relation, it can
have the less number of features compared to 4-gram model, which can relieve
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malware detection overheads. For instance, for the system call trace shown in
Figure 2, the number of features generated by 4-gram model is 15, while the
number of features generated by SCGM is 5, as listed in Table 6.
Table 6. For the system call trace example shown in Figure 2, the features generated
by 4-gram model and SCGM, repectively.
Techniques Features
{openat, brk, brk, getdents64}, {brk, brk, getdents64, open},
{brk, getdents64, open, fstat64}, {getdents64, open, fstat64, read},
{open, fstat64, read, open}, {fstat64, read, open, fstat64},
4-gram {read, open, fstat64, read}, {open, fstat64, read,mmap},
{fstat64, read,mmap, open}, {read,mmap, open, open},
{mmap, open, open, read}, {open, open, read, write},
{open, read, write, chmod}, {read, write, chmod, utime},
{write, chmod, utime, execve}
SCGM {openat, getdents64}, {brk}, {mmap}, {open, fstat64, read},
{open, open, read, write, chmod, utime, execve}
Malware detection performance: Moreover, SCGDet can capture the se-
mantic features of run-time program. For example, the feature, {open, open,
read,write, chmod, utime, execve}, can represent the typical propagation behav-
ior of virus. While n-gram model only considers the strict order of system calls,
which makes SCGDet have the higher detection accuracy and the lower false
positives. The detailed experimental results are shown in Table 7. Because RF is
an ensemble learning algorithm, it has the best malware detection performance.
With RF as the classifier, SCGDet can have a TPR of 97.44%, an FPR of 1.96%
and an Accuracy of 97.78% in our dataset. In general, SCGDet can improve
the average TPR of 2.86%, reduce the average FPR of 14.75% and improve the
average Accuracy of 8.887% as shown in Figure 6.
Table 7. The comparison of experimental results between 4-gram technique and SCGDet
technique.
Technique 4-gram [6] [15] SCGDet
Classifier LR(%) SVM(%) RF(%) Average LR(%) SVM(%) RF(%) Average
TPR 92.86 92.16 95.12 93.38 95.45 95.83 97.44 96.24
FPR 20.83 17.95 16.33 18.37 6.52 2.38 1.96 3.62
ACC 85.56 87.78 88.89 87.41 94.44 96.67 97.78 96.297
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Fig. 6. The comparison of malware detection performances between 4-gram technique
and SCGDet technique
4 Related works
In the past, a considerable number about malware detection researches have been
published. The security researchers have proposed many feature-statistics based
approaches to identify malware. The statistics of features include the frequency,
the prior probability, the entropy and information gain and so on. [11] proposed
an integrated approach that use static and dynamic features to classify the benign
and malware samples. They applied four common machine learning classifiers
to carry out their objective. Ahmadi et al. [4] also proposed a similar approach,
which use API calls to conduct their feature construction. In addition, they
applied the feature selection methods to remove the redundant and irrelevant
features. [17] proposed the visual analysis of malware behavior using treemaps
and threaded graphs and used the temporal values of system object for malware
detection. However, this method can lead to high false positive rates as proposed
statistics have a low signal-to-noise ratio.
The n-gram is a popular data-mining technique, and has been applied in
dynamic malware detection approaches. [13] presented an approach that can
identify the malicious behaviors using Application Programming Interface (API)
and system calls respectively. They applied a signature-like approach in order to
match the n-gram features that are obviously present in malware but absent in
benign programs. Wu and Yap [18] presented a visualization approach to cluster
those malware samples that have similar malicious behaviors. They made use of
byte opcodes and constructed the n-gram features, and they also applied hash-
based technique to reduce the feature space. Because the syetem calls can provide
effective information about the runtime behaviors of the program, many malware
detection techniques based on system call have been proposed. Forrest et al. [10]
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first proposed anomaly detection using the sequences of system calls. Then [14]
used system call arguments and sequences to capture interrelation among different
arguments of the system call, which can detect the abnormal behaviors of run-
time programs. Canali et al. [6] applied common data-mining technique, such
as n-gram, m-bag and k-tuples, to conduct the feature construction and used
machine learning methods to predict the program under detection.
However, these n-gram based malware detection methods can lead to substan-
tial performance overhead due to the huge feature space. Moreover, these methods
do not capture the high-level semantic information of malicious behaviors and do
not consider the frequency of system call patterns, which can result in high false
positives. For example, malware can invoke repetitively those security-critical
system call patterns to perform malicious attack such as denial of service and
CPU starvation. In this paper, we propose the system call pruning method to filter
out system calls that have little impact on malware detection, and propose the
SCGM for feature construction. Our proposed approach, SCGDet, can capture
the semantic features of typical malware behaviors by grouping system calls based
on reachability relation and considering the frequency of system call patterns.
Compared to traditional n-gram based method, SCGDet reduces significantly
the feature space and has lower false positive rate.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we first observed that malware usually invokes security-critical
system calls to achieve malicious activities, and observed that malware and its
variants belonging to the same family usually invoke similar system call patterns
due to performing the similar malicious behaviors. Therefore, we first develop
a system call pruning method to exclude system calls that have few impact on
malware detection. Then we propose a novel feature construction method, system
call graph model (SCGM), to capture the semantic features of typical malware
behaviors by grouping system calls based on reachability relation and considering
the frequency of system call patterns. Compare to the n-gram method, our propose
technique, SCGDet, has the smaller feature space, the lower false positive rates
and high detection accuracy. Experimental results show that SCGDet can reduce
the average FPR of 14.75% and improve the average Accuracy of 8.887%. In the
future, we are purposed to study the classification among different malware to
determine which malicious family the malware sample under detection belongs
to.
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